

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		19 Nov 57	
TO: Deputy Director/Intelligence			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
354	Admin		
REMARKS			
<p>25X1A9a is it all right to send this to [redacted] and Scoville? [redacted] has told us that Dearborn has found our recent material highly stimulating and useful.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>DBD</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">DBD</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Dearborn et al</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Among staff adequately alerted</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>EYES ONLY</u></p>			
FROM: Chief, SRS/DDI			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	
304	2210 E St	2455	

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8  
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

<u>EYES ONLY</u>		
TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		6 Dec 57
TO: Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
	<i>lm</i>	
REMARKS:		
<p>The attached illustrates our problem of impact, which I discussed with General Dunford.</p> <p>I still feel that [redacted] should be on [redacted]. He would be more useful at this juncture, I imagine, than [redacted].</p> <p>Please return.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>DBD</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">DBD</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>EYES ONLY</u></p>		
FROM: Chief, SRS/DDI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
304	2210 E St	2455


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19 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: "First Get Your Sputnik"



1. In response to Depcirtel 428, re the impact of Sputnik, Brussels Embassy cable 706, 15 November 1957, says, inter alia, "Embassy wishes recall previously reported view high Belgian official that known and unsuccessful launching first US satellite can have particularly sharp adverse impact in Belgium and no doubt elsewhere. Obviously situation would be even more serious if launching date had become known in advance."

2. This warning assumes special import in the light of the frenetic scramble of Navy and Army to announce their plans for a satellite launching. I am of course unable to judge the likelihood that their optimistic claims will be borne out. I would note, however, that [REDACTED] whose credentials are that he was a, if not the, key civilian figure in the successful launching of [REDACTED] was, as of two weeks ago, very dubious that the full Vanguard satellite could be successfully launched, even by March, though he agrees that a small satellite could have been launched by the Army six months ago, had it been given the green light.

3. My point is that this publicity rush has: (a) exposed us to considerable potential ignominy if the launching fails; (b) forfeited the substantial obverse benefits of surprise; (c) enhanced the impression of continuing inter-service rivalry; (d) accomplished nothing of value in reassuring either the American public or our Free World friends.

4. I do not know whether any high level Administration decision lay behind these recent announcements, but I would be inclined to suppose that they were uncoordinated at the White House and State Department level. As a constructive suggestion, I would urge that an Executive Order on public statements issued at the time

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1  
X DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 10/3/78  
DATE: 8 JUNE 81 REVIEWER: 103128

of the Korean War be refurbished. I am under the impression this order required that all service utterances of policy significance be coordinated at the SecDef and SecState level and be approved by the White House. Such an order, enjoining "No Comment" on lesser public relations echelons, and reinforced if necessary by a few appropriate disciplinary measures, would go far to alleviate the present confusion.

5. We should by now have learned from the Soviets the golden virtue of carefully orchestrated silence.  
25X1A9a

  
Chief, SRS/DDI